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Abstract 
This paper uses newly released data on political behavior (V-Dem) and urban growth (the Atlas of Urban 
Expansion) to identify, for the first time, a statistical correlation between clientelism (the informal 
provision of benefits, including urban land and services, to the poor in contingent exchange for political 
support) and informal urban growth, across a globally representative sample of 200 cities. The paper 
finds that, consistent with theoretical expectations, cities in more clientelistic countries are likelier to 
experience urban growth in the form of informal settlements that appear to have been planned in advance 
of settlement (‘informal subdivisions’), but are not necessarily likelier to experience unplanned, ad-hoc 
informal growth. The main model for informal subdivisions finds that if a country were less clientelistic by 
one point on a 0-10 scale in 1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions 
between 1990 and 2015 in its cities would decrease by 16% of its previous value, a magnitude equivalent 
to that of an increase in 1990 GDP per capita of $2,700. 
These results support the notion that informality is not simply associated with poverty but also with 
politics. They indicate that particular political dynamics may have a spatial ‘signature’ on the urban 
landscape; that, conversely, certain urban spatial forms may generate certain kinds of politics; or both. 
The paper provides an example of how newly available data may be used to advance our understanding 
of the relationship between politics, urban space, and informality. 
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Abstract 
This paper uses newly released data on political behavior (V-Dem) and urban growth (the 
Atlas of Urban Expansion) to identify, for the first time, a statistical correlation between 
clientelism (the informal provision of benefits, including urban land and services, to the 
poor in contingent exchange for political support) and informal urban growth, across a 
globally representative sample of 200 cities. The paper finds that, consistent with 
theoretical expectations, cities in more clientelistic countries are likelier to experience 
urban growth in the form of informal settlements that appear to have been planned in 
advance of settlement (‘informal subdivisions’), but are not necessarily likelier to 
experience unplanned, ad-hoc informal growth. The main model for informal subdivisions 
finds that if a country were less clientelistic by one point on a 0-10 scale in 1990, the 
proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions between 1990 and 
2015 in its cities would decrease by 16% of its previous value, a magnitude equivalent to 
that of an increase in 1990 GDP per capita of $2,700.  
These results support the notion that informality is not simply associated with poverty but 
also with politics. They indicate that particular political dynamics may have a spatial 
‘signature’ on the urban landscape; that, conversely, certain urban spatial forms may 
generate certain kinds of politics; or both. The paper provides an example of how newly 
available data may be used to advance our understanding of the relationship between 
politics, urban space, and informality. 
Keywords: urban, informal, clientelism, politics, spatial, global 
Introduction 
In order to work more effectively in the increasingly informal cities of the world, urban 
planners and policymakers need to develop a sophisticated understanding of the various 
interrelated dimensions of urban informality, including the political and spatial. 
Particularly in rapidly urbanizing countries, a blind spot with regard to the relationships 
between patterns of urban growth and local political dynamics often results in land use 
plans, infrastructure projects, and urban land tenure policies that prove ineffective. Isolated 
case studies of the role of politics in urban growth abound, but until recently, a lack of data 
has prevented the relationships between politics and patterns of urban settlement from 
being studied empirically across a large number of cities, and in turn from being 
systematically incorporated into policy discourse and planning practice. This study 
attempts to use new data to shed some light on this relationship by exploring how 
clientelism—the informal provision of benefits including urban land and services to the 
poor in contingent exchange for political support—relates to informal urban growth, across 
a globally representative sample of 200 cities.  
The paper proceeds as follows. The rest of the introduction briefly reviews the literature 
linking urban politics, particularly clientelism, to urban growth, and identifies the gap that 
this study aims to partially fill. The next section explains the hypothesis, that clientelism is 
correlated with a particular kind of informal settlement, and suggests the possible causal 
mechanisms behind the hypothesized correlation. Next, the paper outlines the data and 
models, and discusses the results. This is followed by a reflection on the limitations of this 
kind of analysis and the importance of being cautious in interpreting such results. The 
paper concludes by considering the significance of the findings and the ways in which 
future research can use newly available data to build on this study. 
Scholars across disciplines have long studied the relationships between political dynamics 
and urban growth, either through theoretical explorations (MacLeod, 2011; Molotch, 1976; 
Ortalo-Magné and Prat, 2014; Phelps and Wood, 2011) or qualitative studies and narrative 
accounts of individual metropolitan areas (e.g. Atlanta (Keating, 2001), Berlin (Gualini 
and Fricke, 2019), Brisbane (Clarke and Cheshire, 2018), Toronto (Frisken, 2007), 
Stockholm and Amsterdam (Bossuyt and Savini, 2018)), states (e.g. Florida (Feiock, 
2004), Massachusetts (Hawkins, 2014)), or countries (e.g. China (Fang and Pal, 2016), 
Denmark (Olesen and Carter, 2018), Egypt (Nada, 2014), India (Sridharan, 2011), Mexico 
(Miguel Díaz Barriga, 1995), Spain (Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal, 2007), among 
others).  
The costs and benefits of clientelism to the urban poor have also been debated extensively. 
Some observe that clientelism allows the poor to access benefits in the absence of formal 
welfare (Jha et al., 2005; Mitlin, 2014), while others point to ways in which it fosters 
dependency (Benjamin, 2005), hinders political mobilization and solidarity among the 
poor (de Wit and Berner, 2009; Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2013), and is inefficient (De and 
Nag, 2016; Herrera, 2017) and inequitable (Satterthwaite and Mitlin, 2013). 
While clientelism may be involved in the provision of land and services in middle-class 
neighborhoods (Agyemang and Morrison, 2018) or the allocation of units of public 
housing (Levenson, 2017), scholars of clientelism in cities have mostly focused on the role 
that it plays in poor, informal urban settlements, particularly in low- and middle-income 
countries. Relevant studies from the last two decades include several in South Asia (e.g. 
Auerbach, 2016; Banks, 2016; Benjamin, 2005; Björkman, 2014b; Chidambaram, 2011; de 
Wit, 2017; Hackenbroch and Hossain, 2012; Inskeep, 2011; Jha et al., 2005; 
Nahiduzzaman, 2006), Southeast Asia (Aspinall and Berenschot, 2019; Hutchison, 2007; 
Tomsa and Ufen, 2013), Africa (e.g. Adam, 2013; Awal and Paller, 2016; Bénit-Gbaffou, 
2012; Fox, 2014; Gandy, 2006; Levenson, 2017; Nathan, 2019; Paller, 2014, 2019; Rajack 
et al., 2013; Robins, 2008), and Latin America & the Caribbean (e.g. Álvarez-Rivadulla, 
2017; Alves, 2018; Auyero, 2000; Gay, 2006; Gray, 2004; Herrera, 2017; Holland, 2017; 
Shefner, 2006; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Some of these studies (e.g. Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; 
Benjamin, 2008; Fox, 2014) discuss the relationship between clientelism and the growth of 
informal settlements.  
While many of these studies assume causality in one direction, i.e. from clientelism to the 
growth of informal settlements, some (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Auerbach, 2016; Burgwal, 
1995) imply that the causality may also run in the opposite direction, that the growth of 
informal settlements may create conditions suitable to clientelism. In a review of the 
political science literature on urban politics in the developing world, Post (2018) suggests 
that more research is needed in order to understand whether this is the case.  
The above suggests that many scholars associate politics, including clientelism, with 
informal settlements. Yet, attempts to systematically measure these relationships have been 
rare. Some studies do measure the effects of politics on the growth of informal settlements, 
but do so in individual cities (Alves, 2018; Holland, 2017). There have also been several 
attempts to model the growth of informal settlements through simulations, though a review 
of such models (Roy et al., 2014) found that most do not incorporate the role of politics. 
The only one to do so is Patel et al’s (2012) agent-based model, ‘Slumulation’, which 
incorporates the impact of politicians who aim to benefit electorally from a concentration 
of informal settlements. McGrath (2016) modifies the Slumulation model to incorporate 
electoral cycles, such that election periods are characterized by lower rents and more lax 
enforcement of laws in informal settlements. 
No study has yet attempted to identify a statistical correlation between clientelism and 
informal growth across a large cross-sectional sample of cities. This is partly because the 
kind of consistent data on either clientelism or patterns of urban growth that would be 
necessary to conduct this analysis on a global scale have not existed until recently. This 
changed with the release of two new global data sets within the last five years, one on 
patterns of urban growth and the other on clientelism. The first is the 2016 version of the 
Atlas of Urban Expansion (Angel et al., 2016), which includes metrics on different 
categories of urban growth, as discernible from satellite imagery, in a globally 
representative sample of 200 cities. The other is the eighth version of the Varieties of 
Democracy (‘V-Dem’) data set, released in 2018 (Coppedge et al., 2018). V-Dem, 
headquartered at the University of Gothenburg, Sweden, uses thousands of country experts 
to produce metrics on political practices in 201 countries from 1789 onwards, in what it 
describes as “one of the largest-ever social science data collection efforts”.1 The 2018 
version includes for the first time a ‘Clientelism Index’ among its variables. While others 
                                                 
 
1 https://www.v-dem.net/en/about/. Accessed 8 February 2019. 
have produced comparative metrics of clientelism, notably the Democratic Accountability 
and Linkages Project or DALP (Kitschelt, 2013), V-Dem is more extensive in both 
geographic and temporal scope (DALP has data on 80 democracies, for 2008-09 and 
changes since a decade prior). This paper uses these two recent data sets to test the global 
relationship between clientelism and informal urban growth. 
Hypothesis and possible mechanisms 
This analysis makes use of a distinction that Angel et al make in the Atlas of Urban 
Expansion between two forms of informal growth. ‘Atomistic’ settlements are those “with 
irregular layouts that were clearly not subdivided or laid out before residential construction 
took place. This category includes squatter settlements that grew incrementally without an 
overall plan, homes built on irregular parcels of land, or homes built on rural plots that 
were not regularly subdivided before their conversion to urban use” (Angel et al., 2016: 
30). By contrast, ‘informal land subdivisions’ are residential areas that appear to have been 
subdivided for urban use, with structures that are “typically laid out along straight or 
almost-straight roads, with regular intersections and standardized widths” and blocks that 
are “regular or semi-regular in size and shape, when topography permits”, but are 
nonetheless ‘informal’ as they “lack visible evidence of conformity to land subdivision 
regulations such as regular plot dimensions, paved roads, streetlights, or sidewalks” (ibid.). 
(A later section critically examines the use of the term ‘informal’ in this manner.) 
The other categories of residential land use in the Atlas are ‘formal land subdivisions’ and 
‘housing projects’. Formal subdivisions “exhibit a higher level of regularity, a higher level 
of provision of infrastructure [fully paved roads, sidewalks, streetlights], and better 
connections to existing roads.” Housing projects “range from large apartment tower 
projects to suburban tract housing” but are all characterized by homogeneity of design, 
suggesting that they were “built by a single developer using variations on the same plan” 
(ibid.). Examples of the four categories of residential land use are depicted in Figure 1. 
Please insert Figure 1 here 
This paper hypothesizes that countries with more clientelistic politics tend to experience a 
larger share of residential urban growth in the form of ‘informal subdivisions’, i.e. pre-
planned informal settlements. We would not necessarily expect to see either more or less 
of any of the other types of residential urban growth (atomistic settlements, formal 
subdivisions, or housing projects) in countries with more clientelism.  
While this study does not attempt to test causality, in order to establish that the 
hypothesized correlation is theoretically plausible, possible causal mechanisms are briefly 
outlined below. 
Possible mechanism 1: Clientelism causes the growth of informal subdivisions through 
direct provision of land (clientelism -> informal subdivisions). Political patrons may own 
or otherwise control land and distribute it to clients. For example, politicians and 
government officials own over half the land in Kibera, the large informal settlement in 
Nairobi, and these figures or their brokers informally subdivide and allocate plots of land 
to residents (Syagga et al., 2002, cited in Fox 2014). Even if political patrons do not own 
the land, they may collaborate with informal land brokers to organize the informal 
settlement of land, as in Karachi, Pakistan (Inskeep, 2011; Khan, 1992). The land may be 
settled gradually, but the land can be informally subdivided by the brokers in advance.  
Possible mechanism 2: Clientelism encourages the growth and persistence of new informal 
subdivisions through post-settlement protection and regularization (clientelism -> 
informal subdivisions). Even if political patrons are not involved in the initial occupation 
of the land, they may become involved in ‘regularizing’ the settlement after it has formed, 
by intervening to prevent demolitions (Fox, 2014; Gillespie, 2017) and organizing the 
provision of urban services such as water and electrical connections and neighborhood-
level infrastructure like paved roads, sewerage, or public toilets, often through brokers 
(Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017; Björkman, 2014b; Burgwal, 1995; De and Nag, 2016; de Wit 
and Berner, 2009; Gandy, 2006; Herrera, 2017; Inskeep, 2011; Perlman, 2010; Weinstein, 
2014).  
This kind of post-settlement support may happen regardless of whether the built form of 
the settlement is as an informal subdivision or an atomistic development. However, 
evidence suggests that in clientelistic environments, leaders among the urban poor are 
likelier to organize ‘planned’ land invasions, in which an entire community settles a piece 
of land in concert. For example, Alvarez-Rivadulla (2017) demonstrates that in 
Montevideo, Uruguay, the formation of ad-hoc ‘accretion’ informal settlements had always 
been common, but ‘planned’ land invasions grew in number during a period of intense 
political competition, when political parties eagerly courted the votes of the urban poor. 
Burgwal (1995) provides evidence of the connection between clientelism and coordinated, 
pre-planned settlement with the example of a land invasion in Quito, Ecuador, whose 
leaders waited several months in order to carry out the land invasion during campaign 
season, when they would be less likely to be evicted as political candidates fought for their 
votes. In both examples, settlers appear to have taken the opportunity of a clientelistic 
atmosphere to execute larger, more organized land invasions. Pre-planned invasions like 
these are likelier to involve some level of site planning, which would make them take the 
form of informal subdivisions rather than atomistic settlements. Alvarez-Rivadulla notes 
that these pre-planned invasions often subdivide land into streets and individual parcels in 
advance of settlement. The fact that pre-planned invasions are more likely to be laid out in 
advance and are also more likely to occur in clientelistic environments suggests that, even 
when patrons are not involved in the initial settlement, we might expect planned informal 
subdivisions to be likelier to arise in clientelistic environments. 
Possible mechanism 3: Clientelism leads to the ‘informalization’ of subdivisions 
(clientelism -> informal subdivisions): Given that the Atlas does not distinguish between 
settlements based on their legal status but only on their physical characteristics, some 
settlements classified as ‘informal subdivisions’ may have been settled legally but still be 
poorly served by infrastructure. Clientelism may be a factor in this scenario if political 
patrons are able to prevent infrastructure from being formally provided or maintained, in 
order to act as gatekeepers such that access to infrastructure is contingent on political 
support. The example of the Shivajinagar-Bainganwadi settlement in Mumbai suggests that 
such a mechanism is plausible. The local government laid out the settlement in a grid 
pattern and allocated land to households in the 1970s, but antipathy on the part of 
subsequent political leaders towards its residents has caused it to deteriorate into what is 
now widely considered an “informal settlement” (Björkman, 2014a). 
Possible mechanism 4: Settlements with strong leadership and more coordination are 
likelier to be laid out in advance and also likelier to foster clientelism (neighborhood 
leadership -> informal subdivisions & clientelism). Accounts of the growth of informal 
settlements in Montevideo, Uruguay (Álvarez-Rivadulla, 2017) and Quito, Ecuador 
(Burgwal, 1995) also suggest that informal settlements that have strong leadership and 
coordination from the outset are both likelier to be laid out in advance and better able to 
successfully engage in clientelistic bargaining with politicians. These communities often 
proactively seek out patrons, but even if they do not, patrons may be attracted to 
communities that appear able to provide unified political support. This means that even if 
there were no clientelism at the time of the emergence of the settlement, the existence of a 
cohesive community under strong leadership could induce clientelism. Given that such a 
community is also likelier to have subdivided land in advance reinforces the hypothesis 
that informal subdivision and clientelism are likely to go together, even if clientelism does 
not directly cause these types of settlements to form.  
The argument here is not that clientelism is associated only with informal subdivisions and 
not with other types of residential urban growth. If this were the case, we would see a 
significantly smaller share of the other types of growth where there is more clientelism. 
Rather, the argument is that the other types of growth may or may not be associated with 
clientelism, and so would not necessarily form a larger or smaller share of residential 
growth in a clientelistic environment. An informal settlement that lacks a regular layout, 
i.e. an ‘atomistic’ settlement, may indeed result from clientelism, or may foster clientelism 
after it forms. Similarly, clientelism may be involved in the provision of land or services to 
what the Atlas describes as ‘formal subdivisions’ (Agyemang and Morrison, 2018), or in 
the allocation of public housing to beneficiaries (Levenson, 2017). However, atomistic 
informal settlements, formal subdivisions, and housing projects could also arise in the 
absence of clientelism, whereas the discussion above suggests that informal subdivisions 
are particularly likely to be linked with clientelism. For this reason, we expect to see a 
correlation between clientelism and the share of informal subdivisions, but not between 
clientelism and the share of the other types of growth. 
Research design 
The models in this study test whether the share of each of the four types of residential 
growth experienced by a city between 1990 and 2015 is correlated with the level of 
clientelism in the country at the beginning of that period, controlling for the country’s 
initial GDP per capita, the city’s initial size and density, and other variables.  
Data 
Categories of residential urban growth. The Atlas of Urban Expansion presents a range of 
metrics on a globally-representative sample of 200 cities with populations of 100,000 
people or more as of 2010.2 For each of these cities, the Atlas team digitized and analyzed 
a random sample of 10-hectare ‘locales’ within areas of each city that existed before 1990 
and areas that grew between 1990 and 2015, using high-resolution Bing and Google Earth 
imagery. They used this analysis to estimate, within both the pre-1990 areas and the 1990-
2015 areas, the shares of each of the four residential categories defined in the previous 
section, namely atomistic settlements (i.e. those not laid out in advance of settlement), 
                                                 
 
2 The Atlas data are available in the form of interactive charts and maps, as well as downloadable GIS and 
Excel files, at www.atlasofurbanexpansion.org.   
informal subdivisions (which feature signs of coordination and planning prior to 
settlement), formal subdivisions, and housing projects (see Figure 1).  
Clientelism. An index of clientelistic politics at the country level is taken from the 
Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project (Coppedge et al., 2018). The Clientelism Index is 
constructed from three indicators, indicating the prevalence of vote-buying, the provision 
of particularistic vs. public goods, and whether party linkages are programmatic or 
clientelistic. The original variable is on a 0 to 1 scale, but it is rescaled here to a 0 to 10 
scale to facilitate interpretation of coefficients. Like most V-Dem indicators, it is calibrated 
such that higher values mean ‘more democratic’, which in this case means less clientelistic. 
In other words, the more clientelistic a country’s political system, the lower its Clientelism 
Index. It is calculated for each year. The models use the value of the Index at the beginning 
of the period under consideration (1990-2015). This is represented by the Index’s value in 
1990, though models using the average 1985-1995 value are also tested. 
Control variables. The control variables included in the models are listed below, along 
with reasons why they may be expected to determine the shares of the settlement 
categories. Unless otherwise indicated, they were taken from the Atlas of Urban 
Expansion, and are 1990 values. 
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita, based on purchasing power parity (PPP) 
in constant 2011 international dollars (World Development Indicators3): All else 
equal, cities in wealthier countries may be expected to have a smaller share of 
informal growth (informal subdivisions and atomistic settlements) and a larger 
share of formal growth (formal subdivisions and housing projects).  
• City population: As more populous cities tend to be more economically vibrant and 
have a higher demand for land, all else equal, larger cities may be expected to see a 
smaller share of informal subdivisions, which require larger areas of land at once; a 
larger share of atomistic settlements, which require less land and may house 
migrants attracted to large cities; a larger share of formal subdivisions, which may 
be more affordable to residents of larger cities; and a larger share of housing 
projects, in response to a high demand for housing.  
• City population density: Denser cities may be expected to have a smaller share of 
formal and informal subdivisions, as they require more land at once; a larger share 
of atomistic settlements which require less land at once; and a larger share of 
housing projects, in response to a high demand for housing.  
• National annual population growth rate (World Development Indicators4, average 
1985-1995): Countries with rapidly growing populations may be expected to 
                                                 
 
3 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.PP.KD. Accessed 23 September 2016. 
4 https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.GROW. Accessed 11 June 2019. 
experience more demand for residential land, which would lead to the same 
outcomes as high population density discussed above. 
• National urbanization level (share of population in ‘urban centers’ per Global 
Human Settlements Data (European Commission, 2016)): Countries that were more 
urbanized at the beginning of this period may be expected to have lower demand 
for new urban land, which, all else equal, may lead to a larger share of informal 
subdivisions, a smaller share of atomistic settlements, and a smaller share of 
housing projects. 
• Capital city: Residential growth in capital cities may be more politicized, and as a 
result may experience a greater impact of clientelism than other cities in that 
country, which would lead to more informal subdivisions. 
• Cohesion Index: This is a metric approximately expressing how circular in shape a 
city is, used here as a proxy for the geographic constraints faced by the city as it 
grows. A more constrained city, e.g. a city in a valley, would have a smaller supply 
of land, and may have more atomistic settlements and less of the other types of 
growth.  
• Inclusion: This is the proportion of the 1990-2015 ‘growth’ of the city that was in 
fact outlying development built prior to 1990, with which the city merged as it 
grew. These areas would have different characteristics than areas actually being 
settled during this period, though the exact differences are hard to predict.  
• USSR: Plotting the data shows that cities in former Soviet countries have a larger 
share of informal subdivisions in 1990-2015 growth than would otherwise be 
expected (see supplemental material). While the precise reasons for this would 
require additional investigation beyond the scope of this study, they are likely 
related to the major political, economic, and institutional changes that occurred 
after the collapse of the USSR at the start of this period. 
Model specifications 
The models use ordinary least squares regression, with the share of a particular category of 
residential growth between 1990 and 2015 as the dependent variables, and country-level 
variables, such as clientelism and GDP per capita, and city-level variables like population 
size and density, as of 1990 or thereabouts, as independent variables.5  In generic terms, 
the models treat the log-transformed6 share of residential growth of a particular category 
(Y) as a function of country-level factors (X1) and city-level factors (X2) which might be 
expected to be correlated with Y: 
   	 
In each model, the unit of observation is the city, with cities in the same country being 
assigned the same value for the country-level variables. To account for this for the 
purposes of significance testing, standard errors are clustered at the country level. Of the 
200 cities in the Atlas data set, eight are dropped due to missing 1990 GDP data. 
                                                 
 
5 The analysis was conducted in R (R Core Team, 2017), and used the ‘car’ (Fox and Weisberg, 2011), 
‘estimatr’ (Blair et al., 2018), ‘ggplot2’ (Wickham, 2016), and ‘stargazer’ (Hlavac, 2018) packages. 
6 For ease of interpretation and to avoid taking the undefined log of 0, the log-transformation used the function 
f(x)=log(100x+1), where x is the original variable. 
Three types of sensitivity tests were conducted. The first involved adding control variables 
to each model incrementally to observe changes in the magnitude and significance of the 
coefficient of clientelism. Second, the models were rerun replacing the Clientelism Index 
value for 1990 with an average value for 1985-1995, to ensure that the results are not 
distorted by brief fluctuations in this metric. Lastly, the cities were randomly assigned to 
five groups of equal size, and the models were run five times with one group removed each 
time, to test the robustness of the trends to the exclusion of observations.  
Results 
Table 1 displays the results of two models for each of the types of growth, one with a 
limited number of controls and another with the full set of controls. Models 1 and 2 use the 
share of informal subdivisions as the dependent variable. Consistent with expectations, the 
models find a statistically significant negative relationship between the value of the 
Clientelism Index in 1990 and the (logged) share of informal subdivisions in residential 
growth during the 1990-2015 period, i.e. the more clientelistic a country, the higher the 
share of informal subdivisions. Unsurprisingly, the models find GDP to be strongly 
negatively correlated to the share of informal subdivisions: the poorer the country, the 
higher the share of informal subdivisions.  
Please insert Table 1 here 
Model 1 explains 45% of the variation in the share of informal subdivisions. By taking the 
exponents of the coefficients in model 1, we find that if a country were one point less 
clientelistic on a 0-10 scale in 1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of 
informal subdivisions between 1990 and 2015 in its cities would decrease by 16% of its 
previous value. For comparison, if GDP per capita in 1990 were higher by $1000, the 
proportion of informal subdivisions would decrease by 6% of its previous value. The 
magnitude of the effect on share of informal subdivisions of a 1-point change in 
clientelism is approximately equivalent to that of a $2,700 change in GDP per capita. 
In the expanded model with many more controls (model 2), these results are very similar. 
None of the other control variables, other than the one denoting membership of the former 
USSR, are significantly correlated with the share of informal subdivisions. Cities in former 
Soviet states have a share of informal subdivisions eight times higher than cities elsewhere, 
all else equal. 
None of the models using the other shares of residential growth as dependent variables 
(models 3-8) show the coefficient of clientelism to be significant. In other words, 
clientelism does not appear to be significantly associated either positively or negatively 
with any of the other kinds of urban residential growth. This is consistent with the 
theoretical argument above, as these types of growth can occur in both clientelistic and 
non-clientelistic environments. Other models show that clientelism is also not statistically 
significantly correlated with the total share of informal growth, i.e. atomistic development 
plus informal subdivisions (see supplemental material).  
GDP is significantly negatively correlated with the share of atomistic settlements and total 
informal growth, and significantly positively correlated with the share of formal 
subdivisions, as expected, but is not correlated with the share of housing projects. City 
population size is not consistently significantly correlated with any of the types of growth. 
The coefficient of city population density is only significant in the models for atomistic 
settlement, where an additional ten people per hectare corresponds to an increase in the 
share of atomistic settlements of 3% of its previous value. Cities in former Soviet states 
had a significantly lower share of atomistic settlements, all else equal. 
The sensitivity tests suggest that the main results are robust to small changes in the models 
(see supplemental material). For the informal subdivision models, the coefficient of 
clientelism is much larger (-0.357) when clientelism is the only independent variable, but 
once GDP is included as a control, the clientelism coefficient remains relatively stable, 
between -0.154 and -0.173 regardless of the addition of other controls, and is consistently 
significant. When the Clientelism Index value for 1990 is replaced with a 1985-1995 
average, the coefficients for clientelism in models 1 and 2 change from -0.171 and -0.170 
to -0.184 and -0.161 respectively but are still significant in both cases. When the full 
model with all controls (corresponding to model 2) is run with samples arbitrarily reduced 
by 20% each time as explained above, the coefficient of clientelism is slightly less stable, 
varying from -0.146 to -0.194, but is still consistently significant. This range of values 
suggests that if a country were one point less clientelistic on a 0-10 scale in (or around) 
1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions between 
1990 and 2015 in its cities would decrease by between 13.6% and 17.6% of its previous 
value.7  
                                                 
 
7 There is moderate collinearity in the models. Most notably, there is a correlation +0.60 between GDP and the 
Clientelism Index. A full correlation table is provided in the supplemental material. 
Discussion 
The results of the statistical analysis are generally consistent with the expectations 
established above. The evidence suggests that more clientelism is associated with a greater 
share of residential growth occurring in the form of informal subdivisions, but does not 
suggest that clientelism is associated with any other type of growth. The fact that 
clientelism is significantly correlated with more informal subdivisions but not less of any 
of the other three categories that make up residential growth suggests that the additional 
informal subdivisions that are associated with clientelism would not have taken the form of 
a specific one of the other types of growth in a less clientelistic environment.  
The main models above suggest that if a country were one point less clientelistic on a 0-10 
scale in 1990, the proportion of residential growth in the form of informal subdivisions 
between 1990 and 2015 in its cities would decrease by approximately 16% of its previous 
value. To understand what this means, we can take the example of Lahore, Pakistan, the 
city whose share of informal subdivisions is most accurately predicted by model 1 (the 
model predicts 31.36%, very close to the observed share of 31.38%). Pakistan’s 
Clientelism Index in 1990 was 2.6 on a scale of 0 to 10. If it were one point worse in terms 
of clientelism, at 1.6 (between Nigeria and Nepal), holding all other variables constant, the 
predicted share of informal subdivisions would change from 31% to around 37%. This is 
equivalent to the effect of reducing Pakistan’s 1990 GDP per capita from $3,057 to around 
$360, close to that of the poorest country in the sample (Mozambique). If it were one point 
better in terms of clientelism in 1990, at 3.6 (between Egypt and the Philippines), the share 
of informal subdivisions would reduce from 31% to 26%. This is equivalent to the effect of 
increasing Pakistan’s 1990 GDP from $3,057 to around $5,760, close to that of Tunisia.   
Limitations and precautions 
Identification of informal settlements based on standardized, purely visual characteristics  
While this study borrows the term ‘informal subdivisions’ from the data source, it does so 
with full acknowledgment that informality is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, 
one which varies widely between contexts. Many scholars argue that informality is not 
simply a physical fact that can be recognized from satellite imagery, but rather a 
designation resulting from the perceptions and prejudices of authorities (Ghertner, 2015; 
Roy, 2012; Yiftachel, 2009). Settlements perceived as ‘informal’ may or may not be illegal 
in their origins (Björkman, 2014a), and indeed, properties that are considered ‘formal’ may 
violate as many regulations as those that appear ‘informal’ (Roy, 2012). McFarlane and 
Waibel (2012) explain that informality is not simply a spatial category (the ‘slum’), but 
also an organizational form, characterized by spontaneity and tacit knowledge rather than 
explicit rules; a governmental tool which enables certain modes of intervention; and a 
‘negotiability of value’ shaped through shifting social relations. Satellite imagery alone 
reveals little about the political circumstances or intentions surrounding the growth of a 
settlement. Recent scholarship also argues against what it sees as a reductive and 
constrictive ‘formal-informal’ duality, which implicitly ‘others’ the informal (Acuto et al., 
2019). By using ‘informal subdivisions’ as a globally consistent category, as discerned 
from satellite imagery, this paper risks further reinforcing this formal-informal duality, 
‘flattening’ the cross-context variation in modes of informality, and associating informality 
primarily with visual characteristics of the built environment. If so, it does this in service 
of the larger goal of showing how these seemingly superficial characteristics are in fact 
linked to informal behavior on the part of powerful actors in the supposedly ‘formal’ 
political system, and that despite local variations, there is some global regularity in the link 
between these phenomena. 
Subjectivity in input data 
Both of the key data sets used in the statistical analysis, namely the classification of types 
of spatial expansion using satellite imagery from the Atlas of Urban Expansion and the 
classification of national political environments from the V-Dem data set, rely on 
subjective assessments. While both projects go to considerable lengths to harmonize the 
classifications from different evaluators, there is still room for variation in perceptions. 
Use of national-level data at the city level 
In the absence of city-level data for clientelism and GDP, national-level data have to be 
used uniformly across all cities in a country, even though the levels of clientelism and 
wealth may vary between cities in a country. This is particularly problematic for the largest 
countries, which are the most represented in the Atlas sample of 200 cities: China (34 
cities), India (17 cities), and the United States (14 cities). The statistical technique of 
clustering standard errors only addresses the impact that this has on statistical significance 
in the models and does not address the underlying accuracy concern. 
Long time-period in Atlas data 
For each city, classification of residential land use is available in the Atlas data for just two 
unbroken periods of growth: pre-1990 and 1990-2015. The latter period, the one relevant 
to this study, covers a quarter-century in which the income levels of many countries 
increased dramatically, and in which political environments are likely to have gone 
through multiple phases. The effects of these changes on urban growth cannot be measured 
with these data.  
Inability to infer causality 
While this analysis observes a correlation between clientelism and the growth of informal 
subdivisions, it does not attempt to establish causality. While the models use values of 
clientelism for 1990 and urban growth for a subsequent period (1990-2015), this should 
not be taken to mean that clientelism necessarily ‘caused’ this growth, since hypothetically 
the clientelism may have been caused by settlements in the pre-1990 areas of the city, 
which may be similar to post-1990 areas. In theory, regression models could use 
clientelism as the dependent variable and the types of growth as independent variables. 
However, the data currently available do not lend themselves to testing this direction of 
causality, because clientelism is only available at the national level and not the city level. It 
would be a stretch to claim that the presence of informal subdivisions in certain cities 
could determine the overall level of clientelism across an entire country.    
Conclusion 
While the relationship between clientelism and informal settlements has been observed 
across regions of the world in individual studies, this study is the first to measure this 
relationship empirically across a large, globally representative sample of cities. Using 
novel data, it finds evidence for a theoretically plausible relationship between clientelism 
and informal subdivisions, i.e. informal settlements that show evidence of prior 
organization.  
These specific findings have a broader significance for our understanding of the 
relationship between politics, urban space, and informality. The analysis here supports the 
notion that informality is not simply associated with poverty but also with politics. The 
results indicate that particular political dynamics may have a spatial ‘signature’ on the 
urban landscape; that, conversely, certain urban spatial forms may generate certain kinds of 
politics; or both. This in turn emphasizes the notion that for planners and policymakers to 
make positive contributions in informal settlements, they must understand the informal 
political dynamics that tend to accompany them. To the extent that clientelism may 
interfere with the ability to implement formal spatial plans, the fact that some degree of 
informal planning already appears to take place in clientelistic environments suggests that 
professionally-trained planners might find it more effective in certain cases to provide their 
expertise directly to informal settlers, or perhaps even to political patrons and their brokers.  
This study only uses a fraction of the indicators that are now publicly available through the 
Atlas of Urban Expansion and V-Dem, as well as others such as the Global Human 
Settlements Urban Centre Database (Florczyk et al., 2019). Future research can build on 
this study and use these data to explore many other such relationships, complementing the 
already advanced qualitative literature through quantitative studies that are only now 
becoming possible.  
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Figure 1: Four types of residential land use identified in the Atlas of Urban Expansion: 
Atomistic settlements (top left), informal subdivisions (top right), formal subdivisions 
(bottom right), and housing projects (bottom left). Source: Angel et al (2016). 

Table 1: Results of expanded models 
Model no. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Dependent 
variable 
(logged share 
of 1990-2015 
growth) 
Informal 
subdivisions 
Atomistic 
settlements 
Formal 
subdivisions 
Housing  
projects 
Clientelism 
Index (0-10 
scale), 1990 
-0.171* -0.170** 0.030 0.037 0.012 0.001 0.056 0.044 
(0.083) (0.056) (0.049) (0.055) (0.074) (0.076) (0.124) (0.115) 
GDP per 
capita 
(thousands), 
1990 
-0.063** 
-
0.058*** 
-0.014* -0.018** 0.064*** 0.058*** -0.011 -0.016 
(0.022) (0.014) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.029) (0.032) 
City 
population 
(millions), 
1990 
-0.028 -0.031 0.017 0.012 0.042* 0.042 0.037 0.033 
(0.025) (0.024) (0.012) (0.012) (0.020) (0.024) (0.031) (0.031) 
City pop. 
density (p/ha), 
1990 
-0.003 -0.003 0.003** 0.003**  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
National 
annual pop. 
growth rate 
(%), avg. 
1985-1995  
 0.149  -0.092  -0.138  -0.136 
 (0.162)  (0.122)  (0.164)  (0.290) 
National urban 
population  
(share of 
total), 1990 
 0.486  -0.450  0.449  0.656 
 (1.018)  (0.705)  (0.809)  (1.279) 
Capital city 
(N=0, Y=1) 
 0.090  0.077  -0.137  -0.043 
 (0.202)  (0.149)  (0.257)  (0.299) 
 
 

Cohesion 
Index (0-1 
scale), 1990 
 0.322  -0.523  -0.355  -0.343 
 
(0.889) 
 
(0.427) 
 
(0.502) 
 
(0.770) 
Inclusion 
growth 
(proportion), 
1990-2015  
 -0.972  0.149  0.684  0.321 
 
(0.958) 
 
(0.876) 
 
(1.004) 
 
(1.075) 
Former USSR 
(N=0, Y=1) 
 2.080***  -1.090*  -1.097  -0.575 
 (0.392)  (0.519)  0.628  (0.483) 
Constant 
4.818*** 4.079** 2.757*** 3.565*** 1.858*** 2.262* 1.735*** 2.073 
(0.256) (1.292) (0.328) (0.634) (0.473) (0.974) (0.465) (1.509) 
R2 0.457 0.588 0.125 0.201 0.363 0.403 0.017 0.039 
Adjusted R2 0.445 0.562 0.106 0.156 0.349 0.370 -0.004 -0.014 
Number of observations in each model = 192 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors, clustered by country. 
*p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001 
